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Abstract
This note extends the work of Elliott and Navin (2002) on the substitutability of commercial
casinos and state lotteries by controlling for a potential negative selection bias. We utilize a
Heckman two−step selection correction in which our first stage probit involves whether or
not a state has legalized commercial casinos. Results indicate that a $1 increase in state
casino tax revenue will reduce net lottery proceeds by $0.56. This estimate is 33% smaller
than what has been found in other studies, which is consistent with a negative selection bias.
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The past thirty years have represented a large growth in the proliferation of legalized 
gaming within the US.  As of 2001, there were 37 states with state-operated lotteries, 28 states 
with Indian gaming and 11 states with commercial casinos.  This expansion has been met with 
significant growth in gaming revenue.  For FY 2001, the nation’s gross gambling revenue 
(wagers minus winnings) increased 3.1% to $63.3 billion.  Of that amount, 28% was attributed to 
state-sponsored lotteries, whereas another 41% was due to commercial casinos. 
The expansion of the nation’s gaming industry provides states with additional sources of 
revenue.  In FY 2001, states received slightly under $12.5 billion in net lottery revenue (sales 
minus winnings and administrative costs) and an additional $2.9 billion in tax receipts from 
commercial casinos.  Since an individual’s participation in gaming is voluntary, states view these 
revenue sources as a “painless” tax (Clotfelter and Cook 1989), which makes gaming taxation a 
particularly attractive source of state financing.  Because of this, many lottery-only states facing 
financial shortfalls are discussing increasing their gaming base by legalizing commercial 
casinos
1, thereby tapping an unrealized revenue source. Given that lotteries and casinos are 
substitute forms of gaming, the potential exists that the legalization of casinos could cannibalize 
existing lottery revenues.  If this is the case, states could find themselves on the short end of 
revenue projections. 
Empirical research on the issue of commercial casino-lottery substitution
2 is limited to 
the work of Elliott and Navin (2002) who find that during the period 1989-1995, expenditures on 
riverboat gambling had a negative impact on gross state lottery revenues.  They then use average 
tax rates to estimate that a dollar increase in riverboat gambling was met by an 83-cent decline in 
net lottery revenue. 
We expand on this work in three important ways.  First, given that the state is likely more 
concerned with the revenues it receives than gross revenues generated in the gaming industry, we 
use actual tax receipts from all forms of commercial casinos (not just riverboats) and net lottery 
revenue, rather than focus on gross revenues.  Second, we expand the time frame to include 
1988-2000.  Doing so encompasses the legalization of all commercial casinos in the US with the 
exception of those in Nevada and New Jersey, where legalized commercial gaming has been in 
place since 1931 and 1976, respectively.   
Most importantly, we address the issue of self-selection in a different manner.  Elliott and 
Navin (2002) argue for the potential of sample-selection bias in lottery revenues.  Hence, they 
perform a Heckman two-step selection correction, in which their first stage probit involved 
whether or not a state adopted a lottery.  While there may be specific characteristics that 
determine whether or not a state adopts a lottery (Alm et al 1993, Erekson et al 1999), in 
discussing whether the addition of commercial casinos cannibalizes lottery revenue, the state 
must already have the lottery in place.  Thus, we view the potential sample-selection bias to be in 
regards to having legalized commercial casinos, as states with low lottery revenues may be more 
likely to legalize commercial casinos.  If this is so, OLS estimates using a full sample of lottery 
states will show that casino tax revenue is associated with low lottery revenue, although this may 
be -in part- due to the fact that low lottery revenue states are more likely to legalize casinos.  
                                                 
1 For example, within the past year, Governors Mitt Romney of Massachusetts and George Pataki of New York have 
been promoting the notion of allowing casino gaming in their states. 
2 Siegel and Anders (2001) have looked at the substitution between lottery revenues and Indian casino gaming in 
Arizona. 
  1Since we are interested in how states respond to changes in casino tax revenues, we need to 
control for the self-selection into commercial casinos.   
Our results indicate a strong cannibalization of state net lottery revenue by commercial 
casino tax revenue.  Specifically, we find that a $1 increase in commercial casino tax revenue 
decreases net lottery revenue by $0.56, which is a 33% decline from the impact noted in Elliott 




The data used for the analysis covers the mainland 48 states for the years 1988 through 
2000.  This time span starts with the year the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) was passed 
and encompasses when the majority of states legalized commercial casinos.  Annual state lottery 
revenue, including breakdowns on sales, winnings and administrative costs, was collected from 
issues of State Government Finance.  Individual states’ lottery make-up and structure was 
obtained through LaFleur’s 2002 World Lottery Almanac.  We collected state commercial casino 
tax revenues by contacting state casino regulatory agencies.  Data pertaining to Indian Gaming 
Compacts was obtained by contacting the Indian Gaming Management Staff in the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, which is part of the Department of the Interior.  Other state demographic 
information, including population, unemployment rates, educational attainment, and age 
breakdowns of the population were compiled from the Statistical Abstract of the United States.  
All dollar amounts are in real terms with 1996 as the base year.  Moreover, all dollar values are 




To examine the effects of commercial casinos on lotteries, our econometric specification 
is a hybrid model borrowing from the work of Gulley and Scott (1989), who studied the 
substitution between lotteries and pari-mutuel gaming, and Siegel and Anders (2001), who 
studied the substitution between Indian gaming and lotteries in Arizona: 
 
 
LOTTERYit = β0 + β1CASINOit + β2OTHER GAMESit + β3STRUCTUREit + 
β4DEMOGRAPHICSit + δi + τ t + ε it                  (1) 
 
 
                                                
The LOTTERY variable is the amount of revenue generated by the lottery that is given to 
a state general fund or is directed towards other public programs.  Using net lottery revenue 
(lottery sales minus winnings and administrative costs) is preferred to gross lottery revenue since 
the latter does not accurately depict how much revenue the lottery is contributing to state coffers.    
  CASINO is the amount of tax revenue generated by commercial casinos that is given to 
state general funds.  This includes wagering taxes, which are applied to a casino’s annual gross 
receipts (total wagers minus payouts) and admission fees, which apply solely to riverboat 
casinos.
3  We exclude gaming device fees since the revenue generated by this particular fee is 
used by the state to regulate the casino industry as opposed to being used on expenditures that 
service the population at large. 
 
3 See Madhudsudhan (1999) for more details on state casino taxation. 
  2    Following Siegel and Anders (2001), OTHER GAMES includes variables representing 
other gaming choices within a state.  We include a variable measuring pari-mutuel tax revenues, 
which covers the taxation of animal racing, jai alai and the like.  We also include a dummy 
variable for the existence of Indian gaming within a state. Because Indian casinos do not need to 
make their revenue reports public, we are limited to the use of indicator variables for Indian 
casinos.  These two variables cover most remaining legal gaming options in a state, and hence 
should address most of the substitution possibilities for individuals. 
  Included under STRUCTURE is a series of dummy variables addressing the structural 
characteristics of a particular state’s lottery.   We include a variable indicating the number of 
years the lottery has been in existence, since it has been shown (e.g. Vasche 1985,  Mikesell and 
Zorn 1987, Stover 1987) that the age of the lottery has an impact on lottery revenues, with 
increases over the first few years followed by a slow decline thereafter.  Clotfelter and Cook 
(1989) and Stover (1990) also indicate that the existence of a 3 digit or 4 digit daily lotto game 
influences lottery revenues, thus a dummy variable conveying the existence of those games 
within a state is used.  Finally, we include a variable measuring the percentage of neighboring 
states with lotteries.  According to Alm et al (1993) and Erekson et al (1999), an increase in 
neighboring lotteries would reduce the attractiveness of a state’s lottery to out-of-state residents, 
which would lead to a decline in sales and lower lottery revenues.   
  DEMOGRAPHICS contains four variables that describe the background of the state.  We 
include the unemployment rate since Vasche (1985) and Mikesell (1994) have shown lottery 
play to increase with unemployment.  Per capita income captures the amount of disposable 
income available to spend on the lottery.  The percentage of states’ constituents who are over the 
age of 65 is also used since the elderly are thought to spend more on lottery products.  Finally, 
we have a variable measuring the percentage of people within a state that have at least a college 
degree. 
  State and year fixed effects, expressed in Equation 1 as δi and τt respectively, are also 
included.  State fixed effects account for any unobservable political or demographic factors 
within a state over the study’s time period that may influence lottery revenue, whereas year fixed 
effects account for any unspecified federal legislation or national business cycle fluctuations.  
Finally, εit is a mean-zero normal error term.  
 
4. ECONOMETRIC  CONCERNS 
 
  In estimating the impact of commercial casinos taxation on net lottery revenue, we are 
faced with two sample selection issues.  The first involves the choice of observations.  Because 
our interest is determining the impact of casino taxation on states with a pre-existing lottery, we 
limit our sample to those states that have a lottery in place.  This provides us with a total of 416 
observations during our twelve-year sample period. 
  Our second concern involves the issue of self-selection.  The legalization of casino 
adoption is a purposeful reaction to conditions within a state, ranging from political pressure to 
fiscal strain.  Of concern to us is the possibility that states with low lottery revenue may be more 
inclined to legalize commercial casinos in order to generate additional revenue.  If this is true, 
OLS estimates using a full sample of lottery states will be biased.  We therefore perform a 
Heckman two-step selection correction based on the estimated probability to legalize commercial 
casino gaming in a given year.  The legalization equation is used to calculate the inverse Mills 
ratio, which is included into the regression as an explanatory variable. 
  3  Because to our knowledge there is no work examining the characteristics of state 
legalization of casinos, we model our first stage probit equation off the work of Alm et al (1993), 
who study the characteristics of state lottery adoption.  The variables we use fall into three broad 
categories: gaming variables, fiscal variables, and political variables. 
   The gaming variables include a dummy variable indicating the presence of pari-mutuel 
gaming, a dummy variable indicating the presence of Indian gaming in the state, the number of 
Indian casinos in a state, and a measure of casino gaming in neighboring states.  We include the 
first two measures because a state with existing gaming options may find it politically easier to 
legalize commercial casinos.  We add the number of Indian casinos to measure the degree of 
competition a commercial casino would face in a state.  If commercial casinos would not have 
sufficient market share to generate significant tax revenues, the state may decide against 
legalizing their presence.  Our neighbor variable measures the percentage of neighboring states 
that have either a commercial or Indian casino.  A state will likely look at neighboring states to 
see if external gaming options abroad are luring consumers to spend their money across state 
lines.  Increased gaming in neighboring states will increase the probability of a state legalizing 
commercial casinos so that it can keep this potential revenue source in state.
4 
  Our fiscal variables measure unemployment rates, per capita income levels, debt levels 
and federal transfers.  States may view high unemployment rates as predictors of future revenue 
shortfalls, making them more likely to adopt a casino.  Per capita income captures the amount of 
disposable income that would be available for gaming in the state. Since high per capita debt 
levels are often indicative of fiscal stress, states may be more inclined to legalize casinos in order 
to help alleviate their current financial difficulties.  We include per capita federal transfers since 
federal money allows states to rely less heavily on in-state generated revenues, which would 
make revenue from casinos seem unnecessary.  Finally, the percentages of youths (ages 5-17) 
and elderly (ages 65 and over) in the population are also included, since these groups tend to 
receive more in public services than they contribute in taxation.  A state may therefore need the 
revenue from casino taxation to provide services to these two groups. 
  Lastly, we include dummy variables to indicate whether or not all branches of state 
government are of the same political party, since it may be easier for lawmakers to pass 
legislation regarding casinos if the braches are all the same party. We make the distinction 
between the branches being Democratic or Republican.  A dummy variable indicating if it was a 
gubernatorial election year in the state is also included since the legalization of casinos could be 
an issue during an election.
5    
  With this adoption specification, we generate an inverse Mills ratio.  The inverse Mills 
ratio is then included in the regression described above as an additional explanatory variable in 




  Table 1 presents the results of our estimation.  Column (1) shows ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates from our entire US sample without inclusion of the fixed effects, column (2) 
includes the fixed effects, column (3) provides estimations using a sub-sample of only lottery 
                                                 
4 This argument is consistent with the work of Alm et al (1993), who found a positive relationship between the 
number of neighboring states with a lottery and a state’s probability of adoption. 
5 For brevity we do not report the results of the first-stage probit, although the results are available from the authors 
upon request.   
  4states, and column (4) controls for the selection issue by including the inverse Mills ratio in the 
estimation.  
  Examining columns (1) through (4), the coefficient on casino tax revenues is both 
negative and significant in all specifications.
6  This is consistent with the findings of Siegel and 
Anders (2001) as well as Elliott and Navin (2002).  With these results being consistent across 
specifications, we are confident in saying that casino tax revenues unambiguously cannibalize 
lottery revenues to state funds.  More importantly, as we refine our specification, the estimated 
negative effect increases while remaining statistically significant, which speaks to the robustness 
of our results.  Examining column (4) in particular, the negative coefficient can be interpreted as 
a $1 increase in casino tax revenues is matched by a $0.56 decrease in lottery tax revenues.  
Figuring that roughly 35% of lottery revenues go to state funds, and assuming an average casino 
tax rate of 20%
7, this estimate suggests that consumers who spend $5 on casino games (thereby 
generating $1 in casino tax revenue) decide not to spend roughly $1.60 on lottery products.  This 
calculation of a $1.60 decline in gross lottery sales is consistent with Elliott and Navin (2002), 
who had an estimated $1.38 decline.   
    Our other explanatory variables are consistent with the existing literature.  As expected, 
the percentage of neighboring states with lottery programs negatively impacts net lottery 
revenue, as such an increase will decrease the likelihood of the state lottery attracting out-of-state 
participants.  Consistent with Mikesell (1987), the unemployment rate is positively related to 
lottery revenues.  Finally, the number of years a lottery has been in place also has a positive 




  This study shows that for the period 1988-2000, state tax revenues from commercial 
casinos have had a negative impact on state revenues.  Upon controlling for the self-selection 
issue surrounding the legalization of commercial casinos, we show that an additional dollar in 
casino tax revenue is offset by a $0.56 decline in net lottery proceeds to the state.  Our estimation 
of cannibalization is smaller than the $0.83 decline estimated by Elliott and Navin (2002), 
indicating the presence of a negative sample selection bias when this selection issue is not 
controlled. 
  Despite the estimated negative effects associated with casinos, the losses reported here do 
not call for states to stop legalizing commercial casinos.  The study does provide more 
information on the tax implications of casino gambling, and should be considered by politicians 
and voters when weighing the costs and benefits of this alternative taxation policy.  On the 
whole, though, these results speak to the high degree of substitutability between gaming choices.         
 
                                                 
6 To check for sensitivity, the estimations were repeated with the dollar terms undergoing a natural logarithmic 
transformation, as done by Anders et al (1998) and Siegel and Anders (2001).   In all cases 1 was added to the 
variables’ value before the transformation, accounting for any zero values in the data.  In almost all cases, the 
overall trends from Table 1 remained strong.  In particular, casino tax revenues were shown to have a significant 
negative effect on lottery proceeds to the state. 
7 These two tax rates are estimations.  The lottery rate, from Fink et al (2003) is calculated by dividing net lottery 
sales by total lottery sales for FY2000.  The casino tax rate we used was calculated by taking the average wagering 
tax rate of all of the states during our sample.  Moreover, this is also the rate used in Elliott and Navin (2002).  
  5TABLE 1 
OLS Results on Determinants of State Per Capita Lottery Revenue 
(1)   (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Independent Variable
Casino tax revenue -0.182 ** -0.234 ** -0.474 *** -0.560 ***
(0.089) (0.106) (0.169) (0.173)
Pari-mutuel tax revenue -0.892 * 0.781 0.841 0.900
(0.503) (0.654) (0.804) (0.757)
Indian gaming dummy -5.981 ** -3.152 -2.815 2.322
(YES = 1) (2.798) (3.889) (5.584) (5.139)
Digits (Pick 3 & 4) gaming 12.483 *** 1.565 -15.061 ** -12.700 **
dummy (YES = 1) (3.472) (4.883) (6.696) (6.449)
Number of lotteries in US  0.045 1.432 2.463 * 1.184
at year t (0.491) (1.573) (1.359) (1.325)
Percentage of neighboring -12.451 ** -23.913 ** -25.595 -27.015 *
states with lotteries (5.028) (12.084) (17.36) (16.032)
Number of years with 1.705 *** 2.084 *** 2.057 ** 2.213 **
a state lottery (0.232) (0.677) (0.863) (0.864)
Percentage of population -0.260 -1.337 * -0.983 -0.421
w/ at least college degree (0.456) (0.76) (0.932) (0.885)
Percent of population 253.981 *** -72.107 -49.070 188.870
65 years or older (83.066) (197.233) (281.454) (269.897)
State unemployment rate 0.073 1.628 2.815 5.451 ***
(0.97) (1.511) (2.078) (2.074)
State per capita income 0.002 *** 0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -61.228 *** -45.383 -61.616 8.064
(23.423) (38.546) (62.313) (57.306)
State/year fixed effects NO YES YES YES
Lottery states only NO NO YES YES
Contol for Selection Issue NO NO NO YES
standard errors in parentheses
*** significant at the 99th percent level, ** significant at the 95th percent level, and * significant at the 90th percent level
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